Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1972

State of Utah, By And Through Its Road Commission v. Roberts J.
Hopkins, And Betty L. Hopkins, His Wife; J. Andrew Holt And
Hilma E. Holt, His Wife; Wayne Whitehead, A Widower; George W.
Pace And Ann Pace, His Wife; Bernard Seegmiller, And Deloris
Seegmiller His Wife; And Andrew B. Pace, And Verda F. Pace :
Brief of Appellant

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Vernon B. Romney and Robert L. Gardner; Attorneys for
Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Hopkins, No. 12883 (1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5131

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its

ROAD COMMISSION,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

ROBERTS J. HOPKINS, and BETTY
L. HOPKINS, his wife; J. ANDREW
HOLT and HILMA E. HOLT, his wife;
WAYNE WHITEHEAD, a widower;
GEORGE W. PACE and ANN PACE,
his wife; BERNARD SEEGMILLER,
and DELORIS SEEGMILLER his
klfe; and ANDREW B. PACE, and
VERDA F. PACE, his wife,

Case No. 12883

Dependants and Respondents,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from Judgment on the Verdict ot the
Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington Count;J
State of UTAH
The Honorable J. Harlan Burns, presiding
VERNON B. ROMNEr
Attorney General
ROBERT L. GARDNER
Assistant Attorney General
172 North Main Street
Cedar Qty, Utah
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant
PHILLIP L. FOREMASTER, ESQ.
75 North 100 East
St. George, Utah
BRANT H. WALL, ESQ.
530 Judge Building
ll,l 1G i 0 10 72
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Defendants-Respoiide@t.s. Suo·•"'• ·::ou..i
.. __ _

F 1L E D

TABLE OF CONTENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ...
STATEMENT OF FACT'S
ARGUMENT

Page
__ 1
___ 2
2

2

4

POINT I:
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
TESTIMONY AS TO THE PRICE PAID BY THE
LANDOWNERS FOR THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
AS EVIDENCE OF ITS PRESENT VALUE

__ 4

POINT II:
THE COURT ERRED IN PE'RMITTING THE
DEFENDANTS TO INTRODUCE AN EXIDBIT
SHOWING THE LAND SUBDIVIDED INTO LCYrS
AND TO TESTIFY TO THE SAME AND TO VALUE
THE PROPERTY BASED UPON SUBDIVIDED LCYrS ....... 5
POINT III:
THAT THE LANDOWNERS FAILED TO MEET
THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF WITH RESPECI' TO
THE VALUE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY ---------------------- 7

POINT IV:
THAT THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE, UNREALISTIC, AND NCYI' BASED UPON ANY
COMPETENT EVIDENCE ----------------------- -------------------------------- 8
CONCLUSION ----------------------------------------····----------------------------------------------·--· 11
CASES CITED
Epstein v. City and County of Denver, a Municipal Corporation, 133 Colo 104, 293 P2d 308, 55 ALR 783 -----------------------Arkansas State Highway Commission vs. Parks, 240 Ark. 119,
401 SW 2d 732, 26 A'LR 3d 775 ....................
......
State v. Tedisco, 4 Utah 2d 248, 291 P2d 1028 -----------------------------------State v. Noble, 8 Utah 2d 405, 335 P2d 831 -----------------------------------Utah State Road Commission v. Hansen 14 U2d 305, 838 P2d
917

5
7
7
7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7

AUTHORITIES CITED
2-; All! JUR 2d, P 326, 327 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 4
27 AM JUR 2d, P 345 --------------------------------------------------------------------··········--6

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through itsl
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
ROBERTS J. HOPKINS, and BETTY
L. HOPKINS, his wife; J. ANDREW
HOLT and HILMA E. HOLT, his wife; Case No. 12883
WAYNE WHITEHEAD, a widower;
GEORGE W. PACE and ANN PACE,)
his \\'ifc; BERNARD SEEGMILLER,
and DELORIS SEEGMILLER his
kife; and ANDREW B. PACE, and
VEIWA F. PACE, his wife,
Dependants and Respondents,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a condemnation action brought by plaintiff
Road Commission to acquire certain lands from the defrndants for the purpos2 of construction of Interstate
Highway 15 through St. George, Washington County,
ltah. The issues presented on appeal are whether the
Cuurt enorrd in refusing to permit evidence as to the
pri<'e paid by the lando\\ ners for the subject property;
11 lwtlwr the defendant landowners met their burden of
[Jruof as to the \ alue of the land taken and the damage
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to the remainder; if the Court committed prejudicial error by admitting evidence of a subdivided tract of land
when in fact the subject property was unimproved, un·
developed and not in fact subdivided and platted at the
time of taking; and if the verdict was excessive, not
based upon any competent evidence.
DISPOSffiON IN LOWER COURT

This matter was tried before a jury, Judge J. Harlan
Burns, presiding. The verdict was returned in favor of
the defendants in the amount of $73,500, of which $66,.
500 was awarded as the value of the land taken anc
$7,000 as severance damages.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of the judgmenl
on the Verdict entered by the Court below and remanc
of the matter for a new trial before a different jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Road Commission condemned a portion
of property owned by the defendants located within the
limits of St. George City, Utah, and more particularly
area zoned by the City as RA-1, which would permit
St. George City, dedicated in about 1905, as part of block
21 and Block 28, East of 1100 East Street and between
Tabernacle Street and 200 South Street. The streets
appeared on the original plats, as well as the numbered
blocks, but as a practical matter, the streets were nol
open to the property at the time of taking by the Road
Commission. The landowners originally acquired ai>proximately 15 acres in this area in 1965, but the tak·
ing affected a parcel containing 5.72 acres of which 358
acres were actually taken for the construction of In·
terstate Highway 15. The property itself was wholly
unimproved at the time of the taking (July, 1970) and
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pbns for this specific property had been made by
the landowners at the time of taking (R 38, 45). The
property was generally brush land, fairly flat and sloping south and easterly. The property was located in an
a1va zoned by the City at RA-1, which would permit
residential use and it was agreed that the highest and
best use as of the date of taking (July, 1970), was residential or multiple dwelling.
110

Mr. Bernard Seegmiller, one of the landowners, was
called as a witness on behalf of the defendants, and although stating that he was a licensed real estate agent
(R 33) and subsequently that he had qualified to testified before the court as an expert real estate appraiser
(R 266), he did not choose to place a value on the subject property or that portion taken. The Plaintiff's attorney attempted to elicit from Mr. Seegmiller the fact
that the present landowners had purchased the subject
property in 1965, the price paid for such property, and
that with the exception of the difference in time and
increase in the value of land, there had been no change
1n the property, which testimony was objected to by
counsel for the defendants and sustained by the court
rR 48), a prof er of proof being made by the plaintiff's
attorney (R 43, 44 and 45).
Mr. Memory Cain, the expert witness for the defendants, as did Clark Houston in his supporting testimony, was permitted by the court, over the objection
of the plaintiff (R 70), to introduce a drawing prepared
by the witness Cain showing a subdivision of the subject property into twenty-three individual lots and to
then place a value upon each separate lot. That the
ll'itness was also permitted to testify as to damage to
>pccific nonexistent lots. That after being permitted to
"aluc t lw property in that manner, the witnesses were
unable to provide any specific evidence as to costs of
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development and improvement of the subject land.
71, 72, 73, 75, 77 & 78).

(R

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
TESTIMONY AS TO THE PRICE PAID BY THE LANDOWNERS FOR THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS EV!·
DENCE OF ITS PRESENT VALUE.
Where a parcel of land is taken by eminent domain,
it is generally competent, as evidence of its market
value, to show the price at which it was bought, if the
sale was a voluntary one, and not so remote in time as
to have no bearing upon the question of present value.
27 AM JUR 2nd, P. 326, 327. While it is true that the
matter of the admission of evidence of the price paid
for the land is within the discretion of the Court, con·
sidering the testimony as to value throughout the trial,
it was a prejudicial abuse of discretion for ths Court not
to admit testimony of the purchase price paid in the
instant case.
The landowners purchased on contract approxi·
mately fifteen acres of land in 1965 at a total price of
$25,000; the contract was for cash, to be paid in five
equal annual installments with interest; the sale was
voluntary; an arms length transaction with no unus·
ual circumtances. There has been no physical changes
made to the property and the only different circum·
stance was a time factor of approximately five years
and an increase in value.
The defendant landowners' expert witness, in testi·
fying as to value, used a comparable sale that occurred
in 1965 and testified that he could adjust any sale for
time (T 91, 92) and that it was possible to adjust for

5

time by adjusting for increases in land value generally.
In the case of Epstein v. City and County of Denver, a .MunlcTPal corporation, 133 Colo 104, 293 P2d 308,
55--ALR 2d 783, the Court held that in an eminent domain proceeding involving the market value of the
property in question, testimony of the price paid therefor by the landowners four years previously, while not
controlling, is admissable evidence where such sale was
a free, open and voluntary one and the character of the
land was not changed in the interim. The case cited in
the annotation to the above cited case would indicate
that such evidence had been admitted up to fourteen
years. All other factors being present, it would seem
that the question of time, if not too remote, would go to
the weight given the testimony and should not exclude
its admission.
There were no factors connected with the purchase
price paid for the subject property that could not be explained by the landowners or their experts. There was
nothing about the whole transaction that would confuse
the jury but rather it would have assisted them in placing the entire matter in proper perspective and should
have been submitted to them in their deliberations.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE DEFENDANTS TO INTRODUCE AN EXHIBIT SHOWING
THE LAND SUBDIVIDED INTO LOTS AND TO TESTIFY TO THE SAME AND TO VALUE THE PROPERTY BASED UPON SUBDIVIDED LOTS
The subject property consisted of a tract of land
containing 5.72 acres of raw, unimproved land of which
3.58 acres of raw, unimproved land was taken by this
action. Although it is true that the land was located
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within the platted area of St. George City and that the
plat would disclose dedicated streets and numbered
blocks divided into eight city lots, there had in fact been
absolutely no development and/or improvement to said
property and the landowners had no present plans for
the development of the same (T 38, 45). There were no
streets into the property, no water lines nor sewer
lines and none were contemplated as of the date of the
taking.
The admission by the Court of the platted subdivis·
ion of the property involved by the defendant's expert,
even though claimed to be used only to illustrate his
opinion as to how the property might be developed, was
highly prejudicial to the plaintiff's case and confusing to
the jury. The expert witness then testified as to the
taking of specific subdivided lots, 1 through 19 (T 71)
and to the depreciation in value to lots 20 through 23
(T 71). The witness then placed a value on each of the
23 lots of $4,000 each in arriving at the value of the
subject property (T 77). The practical effect of such
evidence was to permit the landowners to treat the
property, and the jury could believe, as if it was plan·
ned, platted with improved streets, curb, gutter, side·
walks, water, sewer, and all utilities, completely ready
for resale.
As a general thing, proof must be limited to show·
ing the present condition of the property and the uses
to which it is naturally adapted. It may be shown that
the property is suitable for division into lots, although
it is not permissable to introduce evidence relative to the
number of approved lots and their speculative value.
27 AM JUR 2d 345.
When the land being condemned has not itself bren
dedicated as a subdivision, it is a reversible error for
the trial court to allow the property owners to exhibit
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to the jury a plat showing how the land could be laid
off into lots and blocks. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Parks 240 Ark.
732, 26 ALR

3n75.

It is further submitted that the method employed
by the landowners expert in arriving at the fair market

value of the subject property was wrong and improper,
that is, arriving at the value of $4,000 per lot for 23 nonexistent lots and totaling the same. That the value
should have been the fair market value of the property
in its then condition, 3.58 acres of raw, unimproved
land, taking into account its highest and best use. State
v. Tedisco 4 Utah 2d 248, 291 P2d 1028, and Stitev.
Noble -flTiah 2d 405, 335 P2d 831.
POINT ill

THAT THE LANDOWNERS FAILED TO MEET
THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF WITH RESPECT TO THE
VALUE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
It is fundamental in the law with regard to condemnation matters that the defendant landowners have the
burden of proof with regard to the value of the land
that is the subject matter of the action. Utah State Road
Commission v. Hansen 14 U2d 305, 303 P2d 917.

---------

The landowners in the instant case, based upon
their method of arriving at the value of the land taken,
failed to meet the burden of their proof. The landowners,
through their expert witnesses, approached the value
of the land taken by dividing the property into 23 lots,
assigning the same value to each lot of $4,000, after
supposedly making an arbitrary deduction of $1500 as
1h0 standard costs in ths area for the development of
« residential lot (T 77, 100) and arrived at the value
of the land taken and the damage to the remainder.
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The expert, Memory Cain, testified (T 77) that his fig.
ure of $1500 only covered the cost of the off-site improvements, curb-gutter, streets, sewer and water. On
cross examination he testified that additional costs
would be involved for such things as engineering, sales
commissions, evidence of title, interest on the money
and so on (T 105) and yet had no evidence concerning
these matters. As a practical matter, he had no specific information concerning the cost of development of
the subject property and his only figures were general
estimates of costs for off-site improvements in St. George
City (T 105). As stated, it is submitted that the entire
approach used by the landowners' witnesses was not
proper but in any event they would have the burden of
presenting proof as to the costs of developing the property as outlined in the Tedisco case.
POINT IV
THAT THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE, UNREALISTIC, AND NOT BASED UPON ANY COMPETENT
EVIDENCE.
Although it is true that the verdict returned by
the jury was within the range of the testimony, there
was not sufficient evidence to support the same and it
is submitted that it was so excessive and unrealistic.
based upon the evidence as presented, that it had to be
based upon a misunderstanding of the court's insti'UC·
tions or other factors.
As to the insufficiency of the legal evidence presented, we rely on the argument set forth in Point III.
The Court's attention is further invited to the W·
timony of the witness-landowner, Bernard Seegmille 1
at pages 267 and 268 of the transcript. The witness tcs·
tified that the landowners had sold a parcel described
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as Block 54 of the platted area of St. George City Suru•v sometime between 1968 and 1970 in two r>arcels,
to-wit, the North and the South one-half of that block.
Thr> property was a part of the original property purchased hy the landowners and was directly west, across
an unopened street, from the subject property. The South
one-half, consisting of approximately 3.20 acres of land,
sold for $22,500, and the North one-half, consisting of
:J.20 acres (T 129) sold for $30,000 or the equivalent of
per acre (T 129). This last sale took place in
1969 or 1970 and the defendants' expert had previously
testified that there was no significant increase in land
values in the area after 1969 or 1970 (T 84).
The landowners and their witnesses attempted to
explain a depressed market in connection with this
property due to threat of taking by Dixie College alt hough they admitted no specific contact from the College. It is submitted that this position was an after
thought as the defendant landowners' expert witness,
early in the trial, had testified in answer to a question
imposed by counsel for the landowers on page 61 of
the transcript:
"Mr. Wall: Did you find from your investigation
that the land enjoyed any unique features by reason
of its location and proximity to the university, or
the college?
"Memory Cain: Yes sir. I felt as it was zoned as
R-3, multiple units could be built on this property.
The single residence could also be built on it. It
was in an area that was not designated by the college to be incorporated into the campus area, therefore it was one of the unique areas in this particular
section of to\\·n that would not be - people wouldn't
hnve to be worried about it being taken for college
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purposes, • • • "
In spite of all of the foregoing the jury then returned a verdict of $66,500 for the land actually taken,
consisting of 3.58 acres of land or a price per acre of
$18,575, which cannot be justified and/or supported by
the evidence and particularly the evidence of a sale
approximately one year prior for $9,375 per acre.
CONCLUSION

The excessive amount of the jury verdict, in view
of the obvious lack of sufficient evidence to support the
same should have required that a new trial, before a
different jury, be granted by the trial court and the
plaintiff submits that it was error for the court not to
have granted the same.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

ROBERT L. GARDNER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant

